Not omniroute's own internal port (API_PORT stays at its default 20129,
unreconfigured) - just the Docker port mapping, so existing NPM/firewall
config pointed at :4000 keeps working without changes on that end. New
OMNIROUTE_PORT env var is the host side of "OMNIROUTE_PORT:API_PORT" in
docker-compose.yml's ports: entry.
Also corrected docs/proxy-key-onboarding.md's dashboard-access
instructions - DASHBOARD_PORT was never published to the host in the
first place, so "http://<host>:20128" was never actually reachable as
written; documented reaching it via the container's own bridge-network IP
or an SSH port-forward instead.
llama-server remains unexposed (no ports: entry, only expose:) -
unaffected by this change, confirming it stays that way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VPZ6TogJiYxG8E4EQBB197
LiteLLM -> OmniRoute (issue #31, wayfinder map + research tickets #32-37):
replace the litellm/litellm-db services with omniroute, split-port mode
(API_PORT published/reverse-proxied, DASHBOARD_PORT never published -
tighter than litellm's old /ui NPM path-deny rule), 5 new secrets in place
of LITELLM_MASTER_KEY/LITELLM_SALT_KEY, llama-server/searxng registered as
omniroute providers post-boot (no static config.yaml equivalent). No
scripted per-workload key minting yet - omniroute's POST /api/keys needs a
dashboard session, not a static bearer key - so OPENWEBUI_OMNIROUTE_KEY is
a manual step for now (docs/proxy-key-onboarding.md).
Caveat carried into the map and README: OmniRoute's own docs
(docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md, MITM-TPROXY-DECRYPT.md, PUBLIC_CREDS.md
on its release/v3.8.51 branch) describe shipped features for AI-provider
client-detection evasion, system-wide HTTPS interception via a locally
installed root CA, and hiding credentials from secret scanners. Proceeding
anyway was an explicit, informed user decision.
Also drops the gateway-level memory/knowledgebase feature entirely (user:
"I don't need it") - litellm-pgvector, pgvector-db, embedding-server,
scripts/ingest-memory.sh, vendor/litellm-pgvector/, docs/memory-
knowledgebase.md. Open WebUI's own qdrant-backed memory/RAG is unrelated
and untouched. litellm-config.yaml deleted (was kept as a rollback
reference, but there's no rollback path to a feature being deliberately
removed).
Not yet verified against real hardware - see issue #31's open tickets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VPZ6TogJiYxG8E4EQBB197
Open WebUI now points at litellm instead of llama-server directly, using a
provisioned virtual key. llama-server's host port is dropped (internal-only
on the ai-stack network) since the proxy is the only intended entry point
now. docs/coding-cli-setup.md repointed at the proxy's endpoints/ports with
per-CLI virtual keys instead of the old shared dummy key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves wayfinder ticket #8. The stack is reached over LAN/WAN hostnames,
not localhost:
- Open WebUI: ai.home (LAN) and ai.haylan.ch (external, via DMZ) routed
through the existing Nginx Proxy Manager instance to the published
WEBUI_PORT — no new reverse-proxy service needed in this repo.
- llama.cpp's raw API stays LAN-only and unregistered in NPM (no auth of
its own); coding CLIs reach it via the box's LAN IP or ai.home directly.
New docs/network-access.md documents the NPM proxy-host setup and the
LAN-only decision. coding-cli-setup.md and README updated to stop
referencing localhost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves wayfinder ticket #6. Covers the two server endpoints (Anthropic
shim vs OpenAI-compatible), exact config for all three CLIs, and surfaces
the shared Qwen3.8-27B tool-calling risk plus OpenCode's own documented
local-backend brittleness up front rather than burying it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
haylanandClaude-Bot